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Abstract: The Stoics are famously committed to the thesis that only bodies are, and for this reason 
they are rightly called “corporealists.” They are also famously compared to Plato’s earthborn Giants 
in the Sophist, and rightly so given their steadfast commitment to body as being. But the Stoics also 
notoriously turn the tables on Plato and coopt his “dunamis proposal” that being is whatever can act or 
be acted upon to underwrite their commitment to body rather than shrink from it as the Giants do. 
The substance of Stoic corporealism, however, has not been fully appreciated. This paper argues that 
Stoic corporealism goes beyond the dunamis proposal, which is simply an ontological criterion for 
being, to the metaphysics of body. This involves, first, an account of body as metaphysically simple and 
hence fundamental; second, an account of body as malleable and continuous, hence fit for blending 
(krasis di’ holou) and composition. In addition, the metaphysics of body involves a distinction between 
this composition relation seen in the cosmology, and the constitution relation by which the four-fold 
schema called the Stoic Categories proceeds, e.g. the relation between a statue and its clay, or a fist 
and its underlying hand. It has not been appreciated that the cosmology and the Categories are distinct 
— and complementary — explanatory enterprises, the one accounting for generation and unity, the 
other taking those individuals once generated, and giving a mereological analysis of their identity and 
persistence conditions, kinds, and qualities. The result is an elegant division of Plato’s labor from the 
Battle of Gods and Giants. On the one hand, the Stoics rehabilitate the crude cosmology of the 
Presocratics to deliver generation and unity in completely corporeal terms, and that work is found in 
their Physics. On the other hand, they reform the Giants and “dare to corporealize,” delivering all 
manner of predication (from identity to the virtues), and that work is found in Stoic Logic. 
Recognizing the distinctness of these explanatory enterprises helps dissolve scholarly puzzles, and 









Stoic metaphysics is a thorny topic.  It corresponds to no formal branch of Stoic Philosophy (which 
is divided into the topics of Physics, Logic, and Ethics), and it is not entirely clear what Stoic 
metaphysics consists in, or even whether there is such a thing.  On the other hand, there is no 
branch of Stoic Philosophy corresponding to theology either, and yet there clearly is such a thing as 
Stoic theology; indeed, it is clear that theology is everywhere in Stoicism, pervading all aspects of their 
thought.1  Likewise, I suggest, metaphysics is everywhere in Stoic Philosophy, pervading their 
innovations in Physics, Logic, and Ethics.  The absence of “Stoic Metaphysics” in the Stoic 
curriculum does not indicate that there is no such study, only that it is not to be sought as an 
isolated topic within one of the formal divisions.2   
 Stoic corporealism is also a thorny topic.  It, too, corresponds to no formal branch of Stoic 
philosophy, and it is not entirely clear what Stoic corporealism consists in, or even how their various 
corporealist commitments hang together (if indeed they do).  The Stoics are famous for saying that 
only bodies are, or have being; also for making soul and even the virtues corporeal by the schema that 
has come to be called their Categories.3  And Stoic cosmology famously finds its starting point in 
two corporeal principles, or archai:  divine, active logos (reason) and passive hulē (matter).  But there is 
little agreement on how these commitments are to be understood, either on their own terms or in 
relation to each other.   As above, however, the absence of “Stoic Corporealism” in the curriculum 
and disagreement about the details also does not indicate that there is no such study, only that it 
does not correspond to a formal topic or division in Stoic Philosophy. 
A more fruitful approach than seeking some one branch with which to identify these 
subjects is to think of Stoic metaphysics as a considered response to Plato’s Sophist.  I am hardly the 
first to notice an affinity between the Stoics and the Sophist, particularly in the Battle of Gods and 
Giants between the “immaterialist” Friends of the Forms (Gods) and the “materialist” Sons of the 
 
1 On which see Algra (2003) 
2 Thus attempts to identify Stoic metaphysics with either the specific or the generic topics of Physics as described in DL 
7.132 (43B) are at odds with each other and do not harmonize with the textual evidence, e.g. Brunschwig (2003), Long & 
Sedley (1987, hereon LS), and Mansfeld (2005), but it does not follow that the Stoics are not engaged in metaphysics at 
all, as Vogt (2009) argues, or that there must be a separate science of being in the manner of Aristotle, for the Stoics to be 
engaged in metaphysics. Parenthetical citations like (43B) refer to chapter and order of the passage in LS.   
3 The Stoics themselves do not call their four-fold schema “Categories,” and the schema is not clearly developed in 
response to Aristotle’s Categories; for the sake of convenience and convention, I will continue to refer to them as 
Categories, but always with this important caveat.   
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Earth (Giants).4  However, it has been less appreciated that the Stoic response to Plato’s Sophist 
reaches beyond the Battle of Gods and Giants to the patricide of Parmenides, by rejecting the very 
dichotomy of being and non-being that generates all the intractable puzzles in the Sophist, including the 
never-ending battle over whether being is corporeal or incorporeal.5   I will begin with an overview of 
Stoic metaphysics as a response to the patricide, then I will carve off the central topic and argue that 
Stoic corporealism consists in a division of labor from the Battle of Gods and Giants, which assigns 
the cosmological work of Forms to physics, and their explanatory work as the identity conditions, 
kinds, and qualities of individual bodies to logic.6  As I will argue, the metaphysics of Stoic 
corporealism consists not only in this division of Plato’s labor (which explains both the absence of 
Stoic corporealism as a formal topic in the curriculum and scholarly disagreement about what it 
consists in), but also in their subtle and sophisticated approach to what it is to be a body in each of 
these domains.   
 Stoic corporealism takes its start from the Giants’ earthborn commitment to being (ousia) as 
body (sōma) ((DL 7.150, Clement, Strom 2.436 (SVF 2.359)), but proceeds with an entirely new 
conception of body, which stands apart in being neither hylomorphic (taking body to be composed 
of matter and form) nor atomistic (taking body to be rigid and full absolutely, and, of course, 
terminating in minima).7   Stoic body is metaphysically simple (non-composite) and fundamental, in 
contrast to the hylomorphic conception, and it is entirely malleable and continuous, in contrast to 
atomistic presuppositions.8  This sensitivity to the metaphysics of being a body (namely, its 
fundamentality and continuous nature) underwrites the Stoics’ equally innovative corporealist 
cosmology, enabling them to build a single, unified cosmos (and all the individuals in it) out of two 
 
4 Long (1974, 153) identifies the affinity with Plato’s “materialists,” Brunschwig (1988) pursues the comparison with the 
Gods and Giants in depth and systematically.  For the view that the Stoic response to the Sophist is to turn away from 
questions of being and non-being altogether, see Vogt (2009).  For recent skepticism about any influence of the Sophist on 
the Stoics, see Sellars (2010); note that by framing the topic around the Sophist as I do, I am not saying that the Stoics 
thought only about the Sophist, or only about Plato; for an instructive intellectual biography that shows the breadth of 
influences on Zeno of Citium, the founder of the Stoic school, see Sedley (2003).   I put scare quotes around 
“materialism” because this is a term not used by Plato or the Stoics, who work in terms of bodies and incorporeals; the 
Stoics are not, properly speaking, materialists but rather corporealists, in support of which see Brunschwig (1988, 72), 
though many persist in terms of “materialism” so when I describe their views I will use (but not endorse) that language.   
5 For a notable exception, see Aubenque (1991).   
6 Note that I am not making “meta” claims about the parts of Philosophy and their relative primacy, but claims about 
the way in which the Stoics divide Plato’s labor between different explanatory enterprises.   
7 By “hylomorphic” I do not mean to invoke Aristotle, or any other particular thinker or school; I mean, generically, the 
twin presuppositions that where there is body there is matter, and that where there is reason or quality there is an 
incorporeal.   
8 For a defense of this view in greater detail in the context of Stoic blending, see de Harven (2018b).  
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fundamental bodies, the active and passive principles (archai), blended through and through (krasis di’ 
holou)… with no Form of Unity required!   
 The Stoic Categories, by contrast, take individual bodies, once built, as their starting point, or 
inputs and offer a corporealist analysis of their identity conditions, kinds, and qualities — daring to 
say (as Plato’s Giants would not) that even the virtues are bodies.  This schema does the logical (as 
opposed to cosmological) work of Forms:  to explain what it is to be a body of a certain kind, i.e. 
what makes something F.  Not only do the Categories have a different explanandum, they proceed by a 
different explanans as well.  The Categories proceed not in terms of the composition of one thing out 
of many as in the cosmology, but in terms of constitution, on the model of clay that constitutes a 
statue, and a hand that constitutes a fist.  What makes this thing a statue is its being clay in a certain 
condition or arrangement; what makes this thing a fist, is that it is a hand arranged a certain way; and 
what makes Socrates wise, is that his soul (a body, namely pneuma (fiery breath) in a certain state of 
rarity and tension) is itself in a certain further condition or state, like a leather glove in the further 
state of being broken in and supple.   
 Crucially, this explanatory schema is not a part of Stoic cosmology or an account of how it is 
possible for many things to compose one, indeed, it is not a part of Physics at all.  Rather, the 
analysis that “makes each of us four” is a self-consciously mereological account of what makes a 
given individual be human (a commonly qualified individual) and be Socrates (a uniquely qualified 
individual) through a lifetime of growth and change, and yet, at the same time, be a lump of body 
that never remains the same, i.e. never persisting through addition and subtraction (growth and 
diminution).  The Categories also explain what makes Socrates be wise and walking, and how his 
wisdom and his walking are each a body conditioned or disposed in certain way; even what makes 
Socrates be the husband of Xanthippe and southwest of the agora, and how each of these is also a 
body in a certain state or condition.  This is how the Stoics “dare to corporealize” all that the Giants 
could not, forging what Jacques Brunschwig has called their “inflationist somatology.”9  And in 
addressing puzzles about growth and diminution, persistence, and individuation, the Categories are 
clearly a part of Logic, alongside studies of the Ship of Theseus, the Sorites paradox, the Lying 
Argument, the Master Argument, and many more metaphysical puzzles.10   
 
9 Brunschwig (1988, 72) 
10 The division of Philosophy called “Logic” includes not only the Stoics’ sophisticated propositional logic (logic proper), 
but also dialectic generally, the science of speaking well, i.e. saying what is true and fitting, hence, the science of 
yardsticks and criteria, definition, fallacy, sophism, ambiguity, and signification, which is to say, epistemology broadly 
speaking, as well as ontology.  See LS26 for texts and discussion; see Ierodiakonou (1993) for an illuminating analysis of 
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The metaphysics of Stoic corporealism consists, then, in the division of Plato’s labor 
between a corporealist cosmology and an inflationist somatology, and their metaphysically 
innovative accounts of body:  on the one hand, as a matter of cosmology and hence Physics, body is 
fundamental and continuous rather than hylomorphic or atomistic, and on the other hand, as a 
matter of mereology and hence Logic, a qualified body is simply a corporeal substrate in a certain 
condition, as clay to statue, or hand to fist.  It consists in a metaphysical distinction between the 
composition of one thing out of many and the constitution of one thing by another.  Stoic 
corporealism is thus no separate topic, but part of a thoroughgoing reply to the Battle of Gods and 
Giants that distributes Plato’s labor across the formal divisions of Philosophy, and metaphysics is 
everywhere in that reply.   
 
Some Lessons from the Sophist  
 
The Stoics famously make Something (ti) their highest ontological genus, set over bodies (sōmata), 
which have being, and incorporeals (asōmata), which do not (see Alexander quotation below).  This 
move can be traced to the Parmenidean puzzles over non-being in Plato’s Sophist.11  The question of 
being and non-being (or, equivalently, what is and what is not) arises in the Sophist (at 237A) out of 
discussion of the sophist as a copy-maker:  how can there be copies, if these are other than what is 
and anything other than what is, i.e. what is not, is nothing at all?   It does seem that there really are 
copies, and, generally, that candidates on both (or all) sides of the debate over being and non-being 
have a reasonable claim to be real (and hence among what is).  But if what is something (ti) must be 
what is or else nothing at all (237C-D), then however one delimits or defines what is will automatically 
banish all other candidates, real as they may seem, to the dustbin of nothing at all (or, with the Gods, 
to becoming).  Hence the debate is immediately intractable, a stalemate with nowhere for either side to 
go in the face of entities with a legitimate claim to what is but that do not fit the chosen mold.   
The Stoic solution is to reject the being-nothing dichotomy as exhaustive:  to embrace (all and 
only) body as being, and to recognize in addition a kind of non-being that is something more than 
nothing at all (239D-240C).  The Stoics prise apart something from being (rejecting the Visitor’s 
 
the interpretive difficulties concerning the division of Stoic philosophy, and Ierodiakonou (2005) on the status of these 
puzzles as thought experiments.   
11 Again, for welcome support of this point, particularly in the detailed exposition of the Sophist, see Aubenque (1991).   
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repeated suggestion that “something” can only be applied to what is), thereby opening the way to 
posit Something (ti) as the highest ontological genus set over both being and non-being.  Alexander of 
Aphrodisias mocks — and hence confirms — this very move:  
 
This is how you could show that not finely do the Stoics posit Something (to ti) as the genus of being (to 
on); for if it is something (ti) then, it is clear that also it is a being (on); but if it is a being, then it should 
submit to the account of being.  But those people would escape the problem by legislating for themselves 
its [sc. being’s] being said of bodies only; for through this they say that Something is more generic than 
it [sc. being], being predicated not only of bodies, but also of incorporeals.  
Alexander, In Ar. Top. 301,19-25 (27B) 
   
The Stoic patricide of Parmenides, to “force on what is not that in a certain respect it is, and 
on what is, in turn again, that somehow it is not” (241D), consists in the recognition of things that do 
not have corporeal being, as Something more than nothing at all, so that the being-nothing dichotomy 
is not exhaustive after all.  These Stoic “non-beings” include, uncontroversially, the incorporeals 
(place, void, time, and the tantalizing lekta, or sayables, roughly: the meanings of our words (SE, M. 
10.218 (27D)) and, more controversially, what is neither corporeal nor incorporeal (creatures of 
fiction (Seneca, Ep. 58.13-15 (27A)), and idealized limits of geometry, e.g. the surfaces of a 
geometrical cone “cut” in half (Plutarch, Comm. not. 1078E-1080E (50C), DL 7.135 (50E)).12   To the 
extent that these entities are not bodies, they do not have being and hence are not and are non-beings; so 
what is not in a certain respect is (in being Something).13  And to the extent that these non-existent 
entities are Something, they are in a certain respect and thus what is (Something) is also what is not (in 
including non-beings). The Stoics thereby expand the ontological playing field, rejecting the being-
nothing dichotomy and, to this extent, they actively participate in Plato’s patricide of Parmenides.   
But, the Visitor goes on, it is not just non-being that will forever make us ridiculous, for being is 
just as confused.  It is here that the Presocratics are caricatured, as “everyone who has ever in their 
judgment [about what is] rushed headlong into delimiting the things that are, how many and of what 
sort they are” (241C).  For every posit that what is is one, two, or three, or that it is hot or cold or dry 
or wet, the Visitor generates equally intractable puzzles concerning being, unity, and wholeness 
(241C-245E).  For example, if all things are two, e.g. hot and cold, and both are and each is one, then 
either they are three and not two (since there is being in addition), or they are one and not two (since 
both are being) (243E-244A).  It turns out that these thinkers know no more about what is, when they 
 
12 Nothing I say here about being and non-being or Stoic corporealism turns on whether we accept Long & Sedley’s posit 
of a tripartite ontology that includes what is neither corporeal nor incorporeal; the incorporeals are sufficient to make the 
present point about non-being.  For arguments against a tripartite ontology, see Alessandrelli (2016).  
13 Pace Vogt (2009, 146-47), who argues that the Stoics do not say of anything that it is a non-being, taking Inwood (2007) 
to task; cf. Bronowski (2019, 127-28), who argues that being has no doctrinal purport for the Stoics.   
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say that hot and cold both are and each one is, than Theaetetus and the Visitor did about what is not in 
contending with the sophist.  At this juncture, the Battle of Gods and Giants is introduced as a 
different window onto the same issue, to establish definitively that what is is no less confused than 
what is not.    
 The earthborn Giants are characterized as those who “drag all things down from the 
heavens and the invisible to earth by inartfully grasping at rocks and trees with their hands” (246A).  
The Visitor explains that this inartfulness consists in their baldly equating being with body (legislating 
that only body is, and therefore that everything else is nothing at all) and in their contemptuous 
refusal to consider any alternative (246A-B, D).  So the Visitor hypothesizes more civilized Giants 
who are at least willing to engage in discussion (246C-E).  These civilized Giants are willing to affirm 
that soul is a body, but they are too ashamed either to deny the existence of justice and wisdom, or 
to corporealize them — so they fold on their corporealism (246E-247B).  In this they are contrasted 
with the untamed Giants, who are so uncivilized that they feel no shame in saying that justice and 
wisdom are “absolutely nothing,” i.e. they are shamelessly eliminative (247C).14  Having admitted 
something incorporeal among the things that are, the Visitor proposes a new account of being as “the 
power or capacity (dunamis) ever to do or undergo anything at all” (247C-E).15  Absent a better 
option, the hypothetically civilized Giants grant this dunamis proposal that being is the capacity to do 
or undergo (247E5-6), and the Visitor goes on to question the Friends of the Forms.   
According to Lesley Brown, the point of the Visitor’s interrogation of the Presocratics in the 
guise of the Giants is that:    
 
those who pontificate about onta or ousia, enumerating basic principles, or declaring being to be 
confined to a certain kind of thing, owe us an account of their theorizing.  They must give at least 
criteria for counting something in or out, or, better still, an account of what it is to be.  Now it is 
highly likely that most of the theorists whom Plato takes to task did not in fact conceive of themselves 
as giving any sort of account of being.  Parmenides, and Plato himself, are the two obvious exceptions 
to this. It is as if Plato's message to the others is: nowadays we expect such thinkers to be more self-
critical, to state and defend their criteria for being, even to say what it is to be, before plunging into 
extravagant theorizing on the number and nature of beings (posa kai poia ta onta). Metaphysics and 
ontology should replace cosmology.16   
 
 
14 Thus it cannot be right to equate the Stoics to the untamed Giants as Brunschwig (1988, 72) and Vogt (2009, 142) do.   
15 I follow Brown (1998) and Gill (2012) in calling this “the dunamis proposal.” 
16 Brown (1998, 204). 
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This, I suggest, is precisely what the Stoics do.  In the first place, they introduce two distinct 
ontological criteria, one for being and another for non-being (in the parlance of the Sophist).17  In fact, 
they co-opt the Visitor’s dunamis proposal and use that as a causal criterion for being, with the result 
that only bodies are since only bodies are capable of causal interaction.18  Further, they introduce a 
second ontological criterion, for those entities that subsist (huphestanai), in the parlance of the Stoics; 
these are non-beings insofar as they are incapable of causal interaction, but Something insofar as they 
are real features of the world that we grasp by the mind rather than the senses.  Thus the Stoics are 
already much more civilized and self-critical than Plato’s Giants, giving an account of their 
theorizing and defending their criteria for counting something in or out, instead of “inartfully 
grasping at stones and trees.”     
 The Stoics are not only civilized and self-critical, but also inclusive about their ontology, 
admitting incorporeals alongside bodies; however, they are principled about their inclusiveness, not 
merely folding in response to the toughest cases and putting Forms alongside bodies like Plato’s 
civilized Giants.  The Stoics remain staunchly eliminative about Forms, yet inclusive of other entities 
that cannot be squeezed in the hands (the Stoic incorporeals, place, void, time, and the lekta); these 
entities are not other-worldly Forms, though they are other than bodies.  By making these non-beings 
ontologically dependent on body, in the way that the flow of traffic depends on cars for its 
subsistence and properties, the corporeal and incorporeal are no longer such strange bedfellows; 
indeed they are no longer representative of a two worlds metaphysics at all.19  Thus, the Stoics are 
able to meet the Visitor’s further challenge, to say what entities as different as bodies and 
 
17 I follow Brunschwig (1988) and Caston (1999) in taking there to be two ontological criteria, though with some 
important differences; see Alessandrelli (2013, 13-4) for the view that there is only one ontological criterion.   
18 In support of syllogizing this way, se Hahm (1977, 12).  For the view that the dunamis proposal is a criterion or 
definition of body rather than being, see Vogt (2009) and Bronowski (2019).  In support of the dunamis proposal as a 
criterion of being, see Alessandrelli (2013, 7-17, 2016), Aubenque (1991), and Brunschwig (1988); for the idea that the 
dunamis proposal is a measure of fundamentality, see Bailey (2014).   
19 The dependence of the incorporeals on body is somewhat controversial; though some take it for granted (e.g. Inwood 
& Gerson (1988, glossary entry for “subsist”)), many take one or all of the incorporeals to be independent of body, even 
preconditions of the cosmos.  For arguments that the spatial incorporeals place, void, room, and surface are dependent 
on body, see de Harven (2015); for the view that the incorporeals are independent of body, see Sedley (1999); and for 
the view that they are co-dependent see Boeri (2001), Bronowski (2019).  For the kind of ontological dependence I have 
in mind, illustrated by the flow of traffic, see “Feature Dependence” in Koslicki (2012).  Note that I agree with Bailey 
(2014, 255-57) that the incorporeals are grounded in body in the manner described by Schaffer (2009), but disagree that 
the incorporeals are independently subsisting “offices” (e.g. the office of being my watch, in the manner of Pavel Tichy), 
ontologically dependent on bodies to be occupied; it is a testament not only to the great variety of grounding theories in 
contemporary analytic metaphysics, but also to the great variety of interpretations of Stoic theory, that I agree completely 




incorporeals could possibly have in common (247C9-D4), with a sophisticated non-reductive 
physicalism that delivers a one-world metaphysics.20   
 To summarize, as ontologists, the Stoics reach beyond the Battle of Gods and Giants to the 
patricide of Parmenides, rejecting the being-nothing dichotomy in favor of a new Something-nothing 
dichotomy, with Something set over being and non-being.  As physicalists, they bridge these two worlds.  
And as corporealists, true to their earthborn nature, we will now see that the Stoics take up the Giants’ 
mantel and reassign the work of Plato’s Forms to body; more specifically, they recognize the 
following two challenges and divide their labor accordingly, to achieve a thoroughgoing 
corporealism. 
 
(i) Defend the Giants:  Maintain that all and only bodies are, or have being — say what it is to 
be before plunging into extravagant cosmological theorizing! 
 




Defending the Giants 
 
We have already seen one important way that the Stoics take up the Giants’ mantel and uphold their 
commitment to body as being, namely by turning the dunamis proposal into a criterion for being that 
can only be met by bodies.  Thus the Stoics do just as Brown hears Plato asking: they state and 
defend their criteria for counting something in or out of the ontology.  But that is not all there is to 
maintaining that only bodies are, or all that Brown finds Plato asking; there is, in addition, the 
metaphysical demand that the Presocratics say what it is to be, before “plunging into extravagant 
cosmological theorizing about the number and nature of beings.”  We will see here how the Stoics 
meet this metaphysical demand, explaining how body can be fundamental and, thus, why only bodies 
are.   
 What it is to be (ousia) is body, as we saw above in observing that Stoic corporealism takes its 
start in this earthborn commitment.  But what is body?   The Stoics define body (sōma) as solid, three-
dimensional extension with resistance.  We know this from the testimony of Diogenes Laertius that body 
 
20 The fact that the phrase “non-reductive physicalism” arose in the philosophy of mind should not prevent us from 
applying it to other cases where something immaterial or intangible is made dependent on body or matter in resistance 
to a two-worlds dualism, whether of the mind or not. 
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is “what has three-fold extension — length, breadth and depth; this is also called solid (sterēon) body” 
(DL 7.135 (45E)); also from Galen and Sextus Empiricus, who report the Stoic definition as “what 
has three-fold extension with resistance (antitupia)” (Galen, Qual. inc. 19.483,13-16 (45F); SE, M. 
11.226).  This definition may seem unremarkable at first glance, like an account that is shared with 
their peers and predecessors, and hence no evidence of Stoic innovation.  However, as we unpack 
and explain the Stoic conception of body, we will see just how much is in fact captured by this 
definition, and how it sets the Stoics apart in the field.   
 First of all, note that solidity is essential to the definition of body, since the Stoics also 
recognize the phenomenon of non-solid three-dimensional extension in the case of place and void 
(Galen, Qual. inc. 19.464,10-14 (49E); Cleomedes, Cael. 1.1.17-19 (Ziegler); Themistius In Ar. Phys. 
104,9-19 (48F); in this the Stoics are similar to the Epicureans.  Secondly, the point of specifying that 
body is solid is not to give a mathematical or geometrical account of body, since its being three-
dimensional already makes it a geometrical solid.21  Rather, solidity establishes that body is inherently 
capable of causal interaction — solidity is the capacity to make contact, i.e. touch (Nemesius, 81,6-
10 (45D); SE, M. 8.409 (27E)); in this too the Stoics are similar to the Epicureans.  This is why only 
bodies meet the criterion for being.   
Thirdly, solidity and resistance are not additional, external properties to three-dimensionality, 
such that these together compose body; solidity just is the kind of three-dimensionality that is unique 
to body, or (better) that body is.  Solidity, resistance, and three-dimensional extension are elements 
of the definition of body, but not components or ingredients of body itself.  In this, the Stoics stand 
in contrast both to the Epicureans and to hylomorphic thinkers (whether Aristotelian, Academic, or 
Neoplatonic) for whom body is a composite of matter and form.  Sextus Empiricus makes the 
distance from the Epicureans explicit when he contrasts their additive conception of body as a 
“collection (athroismos) of size, shape, and resistance” with the Stoic conception of extension with 
(meta) resistance (M. 11.226); the force of the preposition meta, particularly in contrast with the 
additive notion of athroismos, indicates how tight the relationship is, indeed that this is not, properly 
speaking, a relation between two things at all.  Plotinus makes the contrast with hylomorphism 
transparent in his complaints about Stoic matter (hulē), as a corporeal principle (archē): 
 
 
21 Therefore, the definition of body in DL 7.135 is not mathematical or misplaced in Diogenes’ account of stoic Physics, 
as Gourinat (2009, 56-8), Hahm (1977, 10-1) and Mansfeld (1978, 160) worry.   
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(1) Next, how can matter, being a body, be a principle?  For it is not a body unless it is many, i.e. every 
body is composed out of matter and quality.  And if body be other than this [i.e. not hylomorphic], 
then they say that matter is a body homonymously.  And if three-dimensional extension is the 
common characteristic of body, they speak mathematically; but if it is three-dimensional extension 
with resistance, then they do not speak of one thing.  (2) Next, resistance is either a qualified thing or 
issuing from a quality.  But whence resistance?  And whence what is three-dimensional or what is 
extended?  For matter is not in the definition of three-dimensional extension, nor is three-dimensional 
extension in the definition of matter.  Now then, partaking of size it would no longer be simple.  (3) 
Next, whence its unity?  For it is certainly not itself one, but sharing in unity (itself).   
Plotinus, Enn. VI.1.26,17-28 (SVF 2.315) 
 
Plotinus’ objection (echoed by Plutarch, Comm. not. 1085B-C) is that (1) including resistance 
in the account of body as the Stoics do (hence, we can confirm, not speaking mathematically), they 
“do not speak of one thing,” i.e. they speak of something composed of matter and quality (two 
things).  Further (2), he objects that resistance and three-dimensionality are either qualities or 
qualified entities, so that a principle with three dimensions or size, i.e. a quality, would no longer be 
simple; and likewise for the unity of matter as a principle, which from Plotinus’ hylomorphic 
perspective can only be due to its participating in the Form of Unity, never something that matter 
(or body) can have of itself.  Now, the Stoics have a simple, but radical, response available to such 
criticisms:  namely, to reject hylomorphism.  It is an important hylomorphic presupposition among 
Platonists and Peripatetics alike that for something to be a body is for it to have both matter and 
form (and thus for it to be composite, not simple), and an equally important presupposition on the 
Stoics’ part, I suggest, that body is non-composite and fundamental.  This is the metaphysics behind 
the commitment that only bodies are, which goes beyond ontological counting by the dunamis 
proposal to the metaphysics of what it is to be a body:  in order to hold that only bodies are, bodies 
cannot be composed of anything more basic.   
From the Stoic perspective, three-dimensionality, solidity, resistance, size, shape, and even 
unity are not parts out of which body is built.  Nothing in the definition of body as solid three-
dimensional extension invokes prior entities out of which it is composed (without begging the 
question by presupposing hylomorphism).  Thus it is open to the Stoics to treat body as 
fundamental, always with some shape and size just in virtue of being solid and finite.  Much as a lump 
of wax will have a certain size and shape even when it is otherwise amorphous, so too Stoic body, 
qua body, is an amorphous malleable mass that is always of some shape and size or other and none 
per se (Stobaeus 1.132,27-133,11+133,18-23 (28q); Calcidius, In Tim. 312).  Stoic body is thus 
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definite per se and fundamentally, even if it is also indeterminate or quality-less (apoios) in myriad 
further ways (DL 7.134 (44B), 7.137 (47B)).22   
Fourth, the Stoic conception of solidity stands in another marked contrast to the Epicurean 
conception.  Epicurean bodies are composed of infinitely many minima, which are both atomic (i.e. 
uncuttable, indivisible) and unalterable (ametablēta), being full (plerē) by nature and incapable of 
dissolution in every way (Epicurus, Ep. Hrdt. 40 (8A1); Lucretius 1.503 (8B1)).  This means that for 
the Epicureans body is rigid absolutely:  not only completely indestructible, impenetrable, and 
indivisible (call this, generally, being “uncuttable”) but entirely unchangeable, subject to no 
deformation of any kind and impassive in every way (Lucretius 1.525 (8B2), 1.584 (8B4); weight, 
size, and shape are thus absolute properties of the infinitely many atoms in the infinite void 
(Epicurus, Ep. Hrdt. 68 (7B1)).  The Stoics, on the other hand, say that body is finite, completely 
malleable (pathetē), and continuous, i.e. infinitely divisible without reaching minima (Stobaeus 
1.142,2-6 (50A), DL 7.150-51 (50B), Plutarch, Comm. not. 1078E-1080E, 50A-C, Calcidius 292 (44D), 
Calcidius 293 (44E)).  In stark contrast to the atomistic conception of body as rigid absolutely, 
impassive in every way, Stoic body is not only cuttable (both in being penetrable without being 
destroyed and in being infinitely divisible without reaching minima), it is also entirely changeable, with 
no absolute shape, size, or density.23   
Fifth, this Stoic conception of solidity — malleable as opposed to rigid — brings with it a 
correspondingly contrasted account of resistance (antitupia).  The atomistic conception of solidity as 
absolute rigidity and fullness means that resistance must be understood as complete ricochet, or 
rebuffing (apopaltikōs, SE, M. 222-23 (7C4)).   However, the Stoic conception of body as malleable 
substance is not only compatible with, but in fact embraces, a weaker notion of resistance as 
pushback, reaction, or, in the most literal sense of antitupia, a mutual, responding blow, a 
repercussion rather than the complete rebuffing or ricochet of atomism.  This conception of 
resistance means that any two bodies in contact with one another are interacting, because when Stoic 
resistance takes place, it is a joint activity between two bodies, and so all action is reciprocal (all 
 
22 For agreement on this point see Cooper (2009, 100-01) and Gourinat (2009, 57-8). 
23 I use the adjective “atomistic” (in contrast to “atomic”) in reference to this widespread presupposition that body is 
rigid absolutely, shared by Epicureans, Peripatetics, and Platonists alike independent of their commitment to the 
existence of atoms.  
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patheia is sumpatheia).24   This interactive conception of resistance is indeed far from the impassive 
ricochet of atomism.   
Despite the starkness of this contrast, the malleability of Stoic body and interactive 
conception of resistance have been underappreciated and even overlooked since antiquity, which has 
caused difficulty in coming to terms with the innovative Stoic theory of through and through 
blending (krasis di’ holou).25  According to this rather radical theory, two (or more) independent 
bodies mutually interpenetrate and become completely coextended — while remaining whole 
(intact) and independent (see LS48 for texts).  Once it is appreciated that Stoic body is entirely 
malleable, with no absolute size or shape nor, therefore, any absolute density (although always of 
some non-zero degree of density), and that resistance is interaction and repercussion rather than 
ricochet, there is no incoherence to the Stoic posit of through and through blending.  It is an 
unusual posit, to be sure, and through and through blending does commit the Stoics to the complete 
colocation of several distinct bodies, but this is only problematic on atomistic assumptions that 
solidity is rigid fullness, and that resistance is ricochet.  Seen aright, the colocation of bodies that are 
not dense but rare, and not rigid but penetrable, is not only not problematic, it is (as we are about to 
see) the key to a corporealist cosmology.   
Thus the Stoics do indeed say what it is to be: being is body, and body is solid three-
dimensional extension, not on hylomorphic terms but on its own terms, i.e. as simple and 
fundamental.  As a result, the Stoics are in a legitimate position to establish their fundamental 
principles (archai) as two individual bodies: divine active reason (logos) and passive matter (hulē) (DL 
7.132 (44B); Aristocles ap. Eusebius, Pr. Ev. 15.14.1 (45G); Alexander, Mixt. 224.32-225.10 (SVF 
2.310); Calcidius, In Tim. 289).  In fact, Diogenes offers confirmation that the Stoics proceeded in 
this way, reporting that the study of Physics begins with the topic of bodies, before even the archai 
(DL 7.132 (44B)).26  Secondly, given that Stoic body is interactive malleable mass, they are also in a 
position to build their cosmos out of nothing more than these two bodies, by krasis di’ holou.  Because 
the Stoic principles are blended with each other in this way, through and through, they are in 
 
24 For a defense of sumpatheia between body and soul along these lines in the context of Stoic rational impressions, see de 
Harven 2018. 
25 In antiquity, see especially Alexander, De Mixt., and Plutarch, Comm. not. Among contemporary scholars, see Frede 
(2005, 215), LS (294), Mansfeld (1978, 174), Marmodoro (2017a, 163, 2017b), Nolan (2006, 170-71), Scade (2013, 147-
54), Sorabji (1988, 94-98), Todd (1978, 139-140), Weil (1964, 563, 566-7, 570).  For an illuminating history of scholarly 
resistance to the possibility of colocation, and remarks about Stoic blending along the same lines, see Betegh (2016).   
26 The topic of bodies is set apart in being governed by its own preposition (peri), followed by all the other topics 
governed distributively by their own peri.   
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complete interactive sumpatheia with one another.  Add to this the explicitly causal roles of the 
principles — the one cast as divine rational agent and the other as its slack patient — and it becomes 
clear how the Stoics are in a position to deliver unity and order in the cosmos without Form.  There 
is a special unity to the agent-patient relation, in which the agent’s doing and the patient’s 
undergoing are two sides of the same coin, i.e. the two together constitute a single event, e.g. the 
activities of knife and flesh together constitute a joint event, cutting.  In a total blend of agent and 
patient, however, the resulting sumpatheia is not merely a new event like cutting, but the generation of 
a new entity altogether (or perhaps an ongoing event):  the creative, rational agent unifies and sustains 
the compound, tarring the ark inside and out as Philo puts it, so that a new individual is generated 
(Quaestiones et solutiones in Genesin 2.4 (47R)).  This is how the Stoics answer the Special Composition 
Question, when does unity arise from plurality?27  
Being focused on the metaphysics of Stoic corporealism, as I am here, I will bypass the 
mechanics of the corporealist cosmology, and give now only a very brief overview of how each world 
order (diacosmēsis) unfolds.28  Although the archai are eternal, the cosmos itself and the elements 
(earth, water, air, fire) are not (DL 7.134 (44B)); in fact, the Stoics are famous for their commitment 
to an everlasting recurrence of cosmic cycles punctuated by periods of conflagration when the world 
returns to this fiery blend and then starts over (see LS46E-I).  The Stoic world order begins and 
ends with the archai in an amorphous fiery blend (DL 7.142 (46C)); at the beginning of a new world 
order, first the agent (God) turns the whole of this fiery blend into water, and from there generates 
the four elements (earth, water, air, and fire) (DL 7.135-6 (46B), Stobaeus 1.129-130,13 (47A)).  
These elements in turn blend with each other: the rare elements, air and fire, blend with each other 
to create pneuma, a fiery breath that is now (at this stage of the cosmogony) the divine agent of the 
world order, and the thick and slack elements, earth and water, blend to create the slack patient to 
divine pneuma, which is also called “matter” (Nemesius 163,15-18 (47D)).  It is this downstream 
blend of agent pneuma and patient matter from which all individuals of the scala naturae, plants, 
animals, humans, and the cosmos itself, are generated (Stobaeus 177,21-179,17 (28D), quoted above; 
see also LS47A, F-J, N-R).   
The details of the cosmogony are many and instructive, but the point that I am making here 
does not require the details, because whatever the precise order of the unfolding and combination of 
the elements, it is clear that the elements themselves are composed out of nothing but the two 
 
27 van Inwagen (1990, 30-31) introduces this label for the question  
28 For further detail, see Furley (1999), Salles (2009), M. J. White (2003) 
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fundamental principles.  It need only be remembered that everything proceeds exclusively from 
these two principles, in entirely corporeal terms, to see that the Stoics successfully meet Plato’s first 
challenge, Defend the (Presocratic) Giants, with a completely corporealist cosmology, delivering 
generation and unity without Form.   
 
Reforming the Giants 
 
The second challenge in the Battle of Gods and Giants that the Stoics take up is to Reform 
the Giants, and “dare to corporealize the soul and even the virtues.”  The uncivilized Giants, recall, 
are shamelessly eliminative about the virtues, while the civilized Giants are too ashamed either to 
eliminate or to corporealize the virtues.  The choice is put in terms of justice and wisdom, because as 
qualities of soul they are the most recalcitrant case for the Sons of the Earth.  It is clear, though, that 
the challenge applies to the full scope of the theory of the Forms; whatever that may be exactly, it is 
not restricted to the virtues, a point the Visitor confirms (251C9-D3) in conversation with the Late 
Learners, who want to know how something can be one “even when we name him several things, 
that is when we apply colors to him, shapes, sizes, defects and virtues.  In all these cases and 
countless others we say that he is not only a human but also is good and indefinitely many different 
things” (251A8-B3).  Thus, the focus on virtues should not distract us from recognizing that Plato’s 
challenge concerns not just qualities of soul, but all qualities generally.  The challenge is to give a 
corporealist account of what makes something F, e.g. human, Socrates, wise, and southwest of the 
agora.  The task, more precisely, is to analyze the identity conditions, kinds, and qualities of 
individual bodies in completely corporeal terms.  What are the identity conditions of this lump of 
clay?  What makes this clay a statue?  What makes an individual body this unique individual, e.g. 
Socrates or this unique egg?  What makes each individual the kind of thing that it is, e.g. what makes 
Socrates human, or this egg an egg?  What makes each thing qualified in the countless other ways 
that it is, e.g. what makes Socrates virtuous, or this egg rotten?  And if each of these is a body 
through and through, how is growth and diminution even possible, i.e. if Socrates is just a body, 
how can this body grow without the destruction of Socrates?    
This explanandum, what it is to be a qualified body (in these various ways), is different from the 
cosmological explanandum, what it is to be a unified body; in fact, the Categories take the unified body, 
once generated, as the starting point of analysis, making now that one into many.  And the 
Categories proceed by a different explanans as well, the constitution of one thing by another (one other); 
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in contrast to the composition of one thing out of many offered in the cosmology, this explanatory 
schema makes many out of one.  According to the Categories each of us (“all people, animals, trees, 
furniture, implements and clothes”) is four:  substrate (hupokeimenon), qualified individual (poion), 
individual disposed (pōs echon), and individual relatively disposed (pros ti pōs echon) (Plotinus, Enn. 
VI.1.25.1-3, Plutarch, Comm. not. 1083A-1084A (28A), Simplicius, In Ar. Cat. 66.32-37 (27F)).29  The 
qualified individual is itself of two kinds, the commonly qualified (koinōs poion) and the uniquely, or 
peculiarly qualified individual (idiōs poion) (Dexippus, In Ar. Cat. 23.25-24,4 (SVF 2.374); Simplicius, 
In Ar. Cat. 48,11-16 (28E), In Ar. De an. 217,36-218,2 (28I); Syrianus, In Ar. Met. 28,18-19 (28G)).  
For example, this quantity of marble is the substrate (hupokeimenon) of a statue (koinōs poion), namely 
the Nike of Samothrace (idiōs poion), which has a certain patina (pōs echon) and stands at the top of the 
stairs (pros ti pōs echon).   In each case, to be F is to be a body in a certain state or arrangement (schesis).   
The first Category, hupokeimenon, is identified with substance (ousia) (28A4, D8-12), which, 
again, we know is body, and it is exemplified by a lump of clay in relation to the statue it constitutes 
(28D10).30  To be F in this sense is to be body in its per se state:  amorphous, with no particular 
arrangement (28q), some quantity of solid extension for which constitution is identity:  “substance 
neither grows nor diminishes by addition or subtraction, but simply alters, just as in the case of 
numbers and measures” (28D1).  So what it is to be a body in this first sense, i.e. what it is to be this 
lump, is to be body as such, a finite quantity of solid extension that can persist through all manner of 
qualitative change (“alteration,” including change of shape, size, and density), but survives no 
quantitative change whatsoever, i.e. it is incapable of growth or diminution (“addition or 
subtraction,” 28A4, D4).  It is to be the undifferentiated bulk or material constituent of the 
individual.  The first category, hupokeimenon, is thus a thing’s corporeal substance as such, its 
corpulence, and it is best translated as “substrate.”31     
Not only because the hupokeimenon is defined as ousia, which is body, but also because 
individuals like Socrates or the Nike of Samothrace are the starting point for this analysis, we can see 
that the hupokeimenon includes both the matter and the pneuma that compose the individual — it is a 
 
29 I render poion as “qualified individual” to capture the fact that the second Category is the qualified, or a qualified thing, or 
something qualified, in contrast to a quality (poiotēs), in support of which see Sedley (1982) and LS (172-176).  I consistently 
call the second Category the poion, in the neuter, even though it is sometimes given as poios, to capture that this category 
covers all manner of individuals. 
30 For efficiency I cite here, while working on the details of the Categories, just the LS numbers for the relevant parts of 
larger passages that are cited in full above.  The term “ousia” can be rendered “being” just as well as “substance,” but in 
the context of the Categories it is typically rendered as “substance.”  I will follow suit, but with hesitation over 
Aristotelian conceptions of substance and subject of predication that muddy the Stoic waters.   
31 Pace Menn (1999, nn. 1, 2, and 10, and 221-23) against LS, Sedley (1982) and Sorabji (1988) 
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thing’s total corpulence that is its hupokeimenon.32  This point requires emphasis because of the 
widespread, if not universal, assumption that ousia for the Stoics is not body, but matter (hulē), an 
assumption fueled by hylomorphic presuppositions.33  Through the hylomorphic lens, the 
hupokeimenon is matter awaiting its attributes, or an Aristotelian substance or subject of predication 
awaiting its quality, and the primary job of the second Category is to unify and create a single body.  
Thus, the Categories are pressed into the cosmological job of building bodies.  To quote just one 
example, here is Menn: 
 
For the Stoics, following the Timaeus against Aristotle, the οὐσία of a thing is its matter:  the matter is 
purely passive, a portion of-the passive ἀρχή and the thing can only become Socrates or human if there 
is a portion of the active ἀρχή present in it and causing it to be Socrates or human; this portion of the 
active ἀρχή is then the ποιότης Socrateity or humanity.  The οὐσία and the ποιότης are thus two parts 
of the thing, a passive and an active body blended into a whole.34   
 
  Interpretive decisions concerning the hupokeimenon are closely related to analysis of the 
second Category, poion, long assimilated to the quality (poiotēs) rather than the qualified individual, e.g. 
Socrates.  But just as the hupokeimenon is not to be construed as matter to the exclusion of pneuma, so 
too the poion is not to be construed as the form or quality to that matter; and just as the hupokeimenon 
is not to be construed as an Aristotelian substance or subject of predication, so too the poion is not 
to be construed as a property, predicate, or quality.  It is essential to getting the Stoics right to 
respect the fact that the second category is not a quality (poiotēs), but a qualified thing or individual 
(poion); it is not, for example, the quality or property of humanity, but the human being.  There is no 
textual evidence that reports the second Category as poiotēs instead of poion, and yet this assumption 
is nearly universal in the scholarship, belying the hylomorphic lens that blurs our understanding of 
Stoic corporealism. 
  Now, the Stoics are giving an account of what makes something qualified, i.e. F; and in an 
effort to reform the Giants and satisfy the Friends of the Forms (and silence the Late Learners, for 
 
32 Although the hupokeimenon is sometimes described as unqualified matter (apoios hulē) (Simplicius, In Ar. Cat. 48,11-16 
(28E), Stobaeus 1.132,27-133,11+133,18-23 (28q); DL 7.137; Calcidius, In Tim. 290), the context in each case makes 
clear that the terminology is a function of the commentator’s hylomorphic perspective and that the language of matter 
picks out a functional role, and not hulē to the exclusion of logos or pneuma.  Likewise, the term “apoios” does not confirm 
the absence of pneuma just because qualities are states of pneuma; rather, the pneuma will be there, but in its per se state of 
corpulence, body as such.    
33 Bréhier (1928, 132-4); Caston (1999, 170); Cherniss (1976, 799); Collette-Dučić (2009, 196, 200); Goldschmidt (1969, 
20); Gourinat (2009, 57); Hahm (1977, 40); Hunt (1976, 13-16); Irwin (1996, 469-70, n. 24 et passim); Johnson (2009, 
231, 235); Lewis (1995, 100); LS, 174; Menn (1999, 221-22, 228-29); Nawar (2017, 114, 124, 132); Sedley (2002, 2018, 29-
30).   
34 Menn (1999, 221-22; cf. 228-29) 
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that matter), they do take on the hylomorphic explanandum.  However, the explanation they give 
comes from an entirely different perspective, namely the constitution of one thing by another, rather 
than composition of one thing out of many.  Constitution is a one-to-one relation between a thing 
and its constituent matter or stuff, e.g. a tree and the collection of its molecules, as David Wiggins 
famously exemplifies it.35  That the Stoics are pursuing a constitution model is plain from the 
examples they use:  the clay in relation to the statue it constitutes (28D11), the hand in relation to 
the fist (SE, PH 2.81 (33P2); Alexander, In Ar. Top. 360, 9 (SVF 2.379)), and corporeal substance in 
relation to Socrates (28D12).  Their response to the ancient Growing Argument put forth by 
Epicharmus also establishes that it is constitution that is in question.   
 
For the argument is indeed a simple one and these people [sc. the Stoics] grant its premises: 
 
(a) All particular substances are in flux and motion, releasing some things from themselves and 
receiving others arriving from elsewhere;  
(b) The numbers or quantities to which these are arriving and departing do not remain the same but 
become different as the aforementioned arrivals and departures cause the substance to be 
transformed; 
(c) The prevailing convention is wrong to call these processes of growth and decay: rather they should 
be called generation and destruction, since they transform the thing from what it is into something 
else, whereas growing and diminishing are affections of a body which serves as substrate and 
persists.  
 
When it is stated and proposed in some such way, what is the judgement of these champions of the 
evident, these yardsticks of our conceptions? That each of us is a pair of twins, of a double nature and 
two-fold — not in the way the poets think of the Molionidae [legendary Siamese twins], unified in some 
parts but in others distinct, but two bodies sharing the same color, the same shape, the same weight and 
place, <the same but nevertheless double even though> heretofore seen by no person. […]  
 
l am simplifying their account, since they make four substrates (hupokeimena) in every individual; or 
rather, they make each of us four. But even the two are sufficient to expose the absurdity.     
     Plutarch, Comm. not. 1083B-C, E (28A2-3, 6) 
 
  The Stoic response to the Growing Argument is to agree that if constitution is identity, then 
growth and diminution are impossible.  Any addition to or subtraction from a certain mass, or 
bodily substance as such is not a case of change, but rather “transformation,” i.e. the destruction of 
one lump or quantity, and the generation of another.  The Stoic solution to the puzzle, how a body 
can be said to grow if it is in constant quantitative flux, is to make a distinction between the 
corporeal substance of an individual (the hupokeimenon), on the one hand, which does not persist 
 
35 Wiggins (1968, 90-91). Sedley (1992) makes the comparison to Wiggins, but backs away from it in (2018).  The Stoic 
view is in many ways akin to the constitution view of Baker (2007), with the important caveat that for Baker constitution 
is not a mereological relation, because the lump of clay is neither a proper part nor an improper part of the statue, and 
tertium non datur.  I am warmly indebted to Lynne Baker for conversation and correspondence about these ideas. 
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through addition and subtraction, and the uniquely qualified individual (idiōs poion), on the other, 
which the corporeal substance underlies (i.e. constitutes), and which does persist through growth 
and diminution, identical and unchanging from birth to death (28A5, D6).  In other words, they 
deny that constitution is identity for a qualified individual.   
  This dialectic about growth and diminution would be irrelevant if the Stoics were not 
working with a constitution model, and the examples of clay and statue, hand and fist would be ill 
suited if the objective of the Categories were to account for unity and composition along 
hylomorphic lines.  Plutarch’s complaint that the Stoics make us two, but not by the sharing of parts 
like Siamese twins, also makes it plain that composition is not what the Categories are doing, as do 
his complaints that the Categories have all the same physical properties and are indiscernible to 
perception.  Indeed, there is no reason to think that a tree and its molecules should be discernible to 
perception, since this is a logical distinction being made and not a matter of picking out component 
parts or building blocks.  To be F in this second way, then, as a qualified individual (poion), is to be 
the hupokeimenon in a certain state of “intrinsic suchness,” i.e. a qualitative state (Simplicius, In Ar. 
Cat. 222,30-33 (28H)), including the unique, pervasive, and life-long state of being an idiōs poion, e.g. 
Socrates, and the life-long state of being commonly qualified, e.g. a human.36  This Category thus 
explains the uniqueness of every individual body (individuation), its kind, and its persistence through 
growth and diminution.  
It remains to corporealize the virtues, and explain in entirely corporeal terms what makes 
each thing F in the various and sundry ways that it is.  This brings us to the third Category, the pōs 
echon, an individual disposed.  This somewhat awkward phrase means something that holds or 
obtains (echon) in a certain way (pōs), an individual in a certain condition, hence an “individual 
disposed,” e.g. a fist is the hand disposed or arranged a certain way.  This is how the Stoics 
corporealize the virtues (SE, PH 2.81 (33P2), SE, M. 11.22-26 (60G), Seneca, Ep. 113-24 (61E)).  
What makes Socrates wise is that his soul, itself a body (the idiōs poion) has been habituated into a 
sort of maximal sensitivity to the world as it is.37  Virtue is like the patina of a well-worn glove:  it is 
the soul (this glove, the poion) in a certain state or condition of being well worn (supple and with a 
certain patina, pōs echon).  To be F in this third way, then, as a pōs echon, is to be the poion in a certain 
 
36 This reading allows us to dissolve the nest of puzzles that take the idiōs poion to be a property (or collection of 
properties) of the individual that can be isolated from all the others, like so many pebbles in an urn (to use Menn’s 
evocative image), e.g. Irwin (1996), Lewis (1995), Menn (1999), Nawar (2017), Sedley (1982) 
37 For an account of Stoic expertise along these lines, see de Harven (2018a.) 
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state or arrangement; the hupokeimenon is substrate to the poion, and the poion is in turn the substrate 
for the pōs echon (28A3-8, D7).  
Likewise, the pōs echon will serve as substrate for the pros ti pōs echon, or the individual relatively 
disposed, e.g. a well-worn glove held high, or a virtuous person in the agora.   A full description of 
any body must make mention of its extrinsic relations to everything else in the cosmos (Stobaeus 
177,21-179,17 (29D)); for example, Socrates is not fully described without reference to his being a 
brother, father, teacher, in the agora, to the left of Simmias, etc.  To be F in this fourth way, then, as 
a pros ti pōs echon, is to be a pōs echon in relation to everything else in the cosmos.  Thus we can see 
why Plutarch says, at the end of the passage quoted, that each of us is four substrates, and then 
corrects himself to say, “or rather, they make each of us four.”  The language of substrates captures 
the constitution relation of each Category to the next, but since the fourth Category is not itself a 
substrate for anything further, we are not technically four substrates, but three, though we are four 
distinct bodies.38 
It has been overlooked in the literature that the Categories are a distinct explanatory 
enterprise from that of the physics, no longer a matter of composition or building one out of many 
as we find in the cosmology, but a logical analysis that takes an individual once built as its input.  For 
example, as we saw above, Menn takes the first two Categories to be the active and passive archai of 
the cosmology, blended into a whole; likewise Sorabji, uses the schema of the Categories to avoid 
the “embarrassingly strange” view that bodies blend “like so many interpenetrating billiard balls;”39 
and Irwin takes it that the Stoics’ primary concern in the Categories is for “what makes Socrates a 
single organism rather than a mere collection.”40  However, the explanandum, what it is to be a 
qualified body (what it is to be Socrates, human, running, wise, or in the agora), is different from the 
cosmological explanandum, what it is to be a unified body.  And the “inflationist somatology” proceeds 
by a different explanans as well, the constitution of one thing by another, e.g. a statue (poion) by its clay 
(hupokeimenon) or a fist (pōs echon) by its hand (poion).  That this is a distinct explanatory enterprise is 
further supported not only by the proprietary vocabulary of hupokeimenon, poion, pōs echon, and pros ti 
pōs echon not found in the cosmology, but also by the fact that the Categories are a self-consciously 
 
38 Thus we need not worry about what motivates the Stoics to posit a “doctrine of several substrates” as though a 
second substrate only arises out of a failure of the first, as Irwin (1996) does, with sympathy for the problem in Sedley 
(2018).  The univocity of this relation also cuts against developmental accounts that take the first two Categories to be 
doing something different from the second two, e.g. Menn (1999), among many others.  
39 Sorabji (1988, 88-89, 95-98, 103) 
40 Irwin (1996, 469-470, n. 24), followed by Nawar (2017) 
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mereological analysis, where the cosmology is not.  The following excerpt from Stobaeus 1.177,21-
179,19 (28D) makes the mereology explicit:    
 
But the uniquely qualified individual (idiōs poion) and the substance (ousia) out of which that [individual] 
is [constituted], are not the same thing, nor, mind you, are they different (heteron) either, but merely not 
the same, because of the fact that the substance both is a part (meros) and occupies the same place, while 
those things called different must be both separate in place and not conceived of as a part.  And that 
what holds of the uniquely qualified individual and what holds of the substance are not the same, 
Mnesarchus says is clear; for it is necessary that things that are the same have the same properties.  For 
if someone who molded a horse, for the sake of argument, were to smash it, then produce a dog, it 
would be reasonable for us seeing this to say that this back then did not exist, but now it exists; so, what 
is said in the case of the qualified individual is different.                               (28D9-11)  
 
The language of parthood and being neither the same nor different is indisputably the 
mereological vocabulary of the time, and the hupokeimenon is clearly in the role of part to the idiōs 
poion; no such language appears in the context of Physics.41  Furthermore, the working example of 
the statue shows that this is a one-to-one mereological relation, not a many-to-one relation, with the 
hupokeimenon persisting (as a quantity of corporeal substance) through all manner of qualitative 
change, from constituting now a horse, to now a lump, and now a dog.42  In each iteration, the 
substrate is the only part of the statue, just as the hand is the only part now of a fist, now of a peace 
sign.43  The move from one Category to the next is not a matter of introducing a new entity to what 
was there before.  For example, the move from clay (hupokeimenon) to statue (poion) does not involve 
the addition of anything to the hupokeimenon; the sculptor generates a statue by altering the shape of 
the clay, and this is a case of generation by alteration (28D3-4), not the acquisition of a distinct 
entity, e.g. a Form (except on hylomorphic assumptions).  Nor, likewise, does the hand receive 
anything new, any addition from outside itself, in order to constitute a fist.44   The appeal in this 
passage to what we now call Leibniz’s Law confirms that this is not the same project as the 
cosmology, it being necessary to appeal to distinct persistence conditions to differentiate the 
 
41 For the mereology of the time see Barnes (1988).  Even though the cosmos is referred to as the whole (to holon), the 
archai, elements, et al. are never referred to as parts or as being neither the same nor different from the whole; this does 
not mean there are no mereological commitments in the cosmology, it means that the cosmology is not a self-
consciously mereological enterprise.   
42 Empirical worries that a lump of clay would certainly lose some of its substance during such a molding and remolding 
process are out of place in a thought experiment like this; see Irwin (1996, 465).   
43 Plotinus, Enn.VI.1.30.24-28; Comm. not. 1077C (28O1); Philo, Aet. mund. 48 (28P)  
44 Rather, it gets arranged as a fist by divine immanent reason, logos or pneuma, transforming itself, along with the matter 
with which it is blended through and through in complete sumpatheia (Galen, Caus. cont. 1.1-2.4 (55F)).  The immanence 
of divine active reason means the Stoics have no need of an independently subsisting structure distinct from the cosmos 
itself, as Bailey (2014) and Bronowski (2019) both urge, albeit in very different ways.   
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Categories from one another, since, as we saw Plutarch put it, they share “the same shape, the same 
weight and place, <the same but nevertheless double even though> heretofore seen by no person.”   
Once it is recognized that the Categories are not aiming to build or unify bodies, and we let 
go of the hylomorphic urge to press the first two Categories into the roles of matter and form or 
subject and quality, we can see that this explanatory enterprise stands on its own.  It does not 
compete or cooperate with the cosmology in trying to explain generation and unity, but rather takes 
those individuals, once generated, as inputs for a four-fold logical analysis of their identity 
conditions (for both individuation and persistence), kinds, and qualities.  Thus the Categories are 
properly described as four distinct metaphysical aspects of an individual body, rather than as an 
answer to matter and form, substance and quality, or subject and predicate; nor is this an alternative 
to blending, or a semantic schema of meanings and reference classes.45  To be F is simply to be a 
body in a certain state or arrangement—no Forms required!  This is how the Stoics respond to 
Plato’s challenge, Reform the Giants, and dare to corporealize the virtues, at once taming their 
savage eliminative predecessors and breathing life into the civilized Giants gone too soft.    
In addition, this analysis resolves several interpretive puzzles that have been raised in the 
literature.  It explains how each of us can be four distinct bodies, but with all the same physical 
properties, thereby neutralizing worries that the Stoics were genuinely vulnerable to charges of 
“incoherent dualism.”46  It also explains talk of a qualified individual “coming to occupy” (genesthai 
epi) substance without inviting the intuition that there are “two different items crammed in the same 
place;” when a lump of clay is reshaped into the form of a dog, this is simply a case of generation by 
alteration, and the idea of a qualified individual coming about in a substrate (as I prefer for genesthai 
epi) need not invoke any hylomorphic intuitions, or the idea that a composite comes to occupy a part 
of itself.47  We can also dispense with concerns that there was internal disagreement over the 
persistence of the hupokeimenon, and puzzlement over why the Stoics “needed” to posit several 
substrates to begin with; the hupokeimenon is consistently (i.e. without disagreement among Stoics) an 
“extreme Lockean mass” subject to no quantitative change, but it is not because the hupokeimenon 
 
45 Interpretations of the Categories run wide, from semantic to ontological to physical.  The metaphysical aspects view is 
endorsed by Brunschwig (2003), LS, and Sedley (1982 and, with some differences, 2018).    
46 Sedley (1982); Collette-Dučić (2009, 194), also takes Chrysippus’ “enthusiasm for difference and multiplicity” to invite 
many problems 
47 Sedley (2018); nor is there any internal conflict between the mereology of the Categories, which specifies that a part 
must be separable in place from the whole, and the Stoic commitment to blending, which is committed to colocation — 
there is no conflict because blended bodies are not related to each other as part to whole, and all blended bodies are 
separable in principle, even if they are never in fact found apart (as with the archai).   
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fails as a substrate that another one is required.48  There is in fact no “doctrine of two substrates,” 
there is just the language of substrates as a way to capture the constitution relation between the four 
Categories.  Finally, there is no need to worry that the idiōs poion is not fit for both individuation and 
persistence, either; the peculiar quality is not some single feature, or some collection of qualities that 
could be lost or gained or be qualitatively identical to someone else’s, but a pervasive qualitative state 
(or “intrinsic suchness”) present everywhere in the individual, unique and unchanging from birth to 
death as a certain je ne sais quoi.   That these are metaphysical concerns should be clear. 
Not only do the Categories stand on their own once they are no longer pressed into duties 
they are not suited or designed for, they fall into place alongside the cosmology as a complementary 
explanatory enterprise.  The explanatory enterprise of the cosmology is unity and generation, the 
composition of one thing out of many; this was the challenge to defend the Presocratic commitment 
to body.  The explanatory enterprise of the Categories, on the other hand, is to take those bodies, 
once built, and give a logical analysis of what makes them F in the various ways that they are, making 
many out of one; this was the challenge to specify the identity conditions, kinds, and qualities of all 
individual bodies in entirely corporeal terms.  Stoic corporealism is thus an efficient division of 
Plato’s labor in the Battle of Gods and Giants (cosmological unity and predicational plurality) 
between Physics and Logic.    
 
The Metaphysics of Stoic Corporealism 
 
So what is the metaphysics of Stoic corporealism?  What underwrites the commitment that only 
bodies are, or have being?  The first way the Stoics uphold this central thesis that only bodies are is by 
coopting the dunamis proposal to admit only bodies.  This is no savage insistence that body is all 
there is, but part of a broader response to questions of being and non-being — only bodies are, but 
thanks to the introduction of two distinct ontological criteria, not everything that is Something exists.  
However, this is not yet metaphysics.  The commitment that only bodies are only takes on 
 
48 Irwin (1996) finds the Stoics impaled on the following dilemma: accept Mnesarchus’ “more reasonable” view that the 
hupokeimenon is a relatively stable continuant (on the basis of empirical worries mentioned above, n. 42), but thereby 
undermine the need for a second substrate to persist through changes; or accept Posidonius’ view of the hupokeimenon as 
an extreme Lockean mass, thereby justifying the call for a second substratum (the poion) to be what persists through 
change, but also thereby running afoul of common sense, forced to deny the existence of compost heaps.  However, 
taking the hupokeimenon to be an extreme Lockean mass, as the Stoics indeed do, does not commit them to denying the 
existence of compost heaps; it commits them to distinguishing between a compost heap and its hupokeimenon, which they 
are equipped to do (Simplicius, In Ar. Cat. 214,24-37 (28M)). 
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metaphysical substance where the ontological criterion for being (the dunamis proposal) leaves off, as 
the endeavor to say what it is to be rather than merely to count as a being.  Now, what it is to be (ousia) 
is body, to be sure, but how can body simply be?  This brings us to the second way the Stoics 
uphold the earthborn thesis that only bodies are, namely by their conception of body as 
fundamental:  Stoic body is neither a hylomorphic composite, nor an atomistic aggregate, and hence 
metaphysically simple.  So the Stoics can make body fundamental, and hypothesize two corporeal 
archai for the cosmos, but how can they deliver unity and generation out of nothing but bodies?  
This brings us to the third way the Stoics uphold the thesis that only bodies are, namely by 
continuous and malleable nature of Stoic body, neither rigid nor full, which licenses the unusual 
posit of through and through blending by which the Stoics generate one thing out of many, with the 
causal complexity of agent and patient instead of the ontological complexity of matter and form.  So 
the Stoics can deliver a corporealist cosmology, but this is hardly a complete corporealism; how can 
they account for the identity conditions, kinds, and qualities of bodies without reference to Forms?  
This brings us to the fourth way that only bodies are for the Stoics, by the constitution relation of 
the Categories, which completes their corporealism by giving a logical analysis of what makes a body 
F in terms only of other bodies, allowing them to deliver all manner of predication without Form.  
And all of this is metaphysics — fundamentality, the continuum, blending, colocation, and 
composition in contrast to constitution.  Metaphysics is thus no separate topic or study in Stoic 
philosophy, or within Stoic corporealism.  It is, rather, everywhere and pervasive.49   
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